The Cayman Islands’ Domestic Partnership Bill, 2020 &
                  Governor Martyn Roper’s intention to Assent to it
                                  ++++++++++++++++++++
                                                 O P I N I O N
                 (By Right Honourable Dame Joan A. Sawyer, DBE)

I have been asked to give a legal opinion on Governor Martyn Roper’s

statement published on August 5, 2020 in light of the fact that the
Legislative Assembly rejected the Domestic Partnership Bill by a 9 to 8 vote
after extensive debate in that Assembly.

The material parts of Governor Roper’s statement read:

“Following the failure of the Legislative Assembly to pass the Domestic
Partnership Bill on the 29th July 2020 into law, I have discussed the legal
implications of the decision with the FCO and UK Ministers.

“The Cayman Islands Court of Appeal was clear that Cayman is in breach of
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) by its continuing failure to put in place a framework
for same sex couples that is functionally equivalent to marriage. Both I and
the FCO were grateful to the Honourable Premier and Attorney-General for
their considerable effort in seeking to put the law in place. It was clear to
me that the Bill would satisfy the legal requirement and at the same time
maintain the current definition of marriage. I fully recognise how sensitive
and controversial this issue is. But it was my expectation, and that of the
FCO, that all lawmakers would recognise their legal responsibility and pass
the Bill after debate in the Legislative Assembly.

“The failure of the Legislative Assembly to pass the Domestic Partnership
Bill leaves me, as Governor and the UK Government, with no option but to
act to uphold the law. The question of same sex marriage is currently
before the Privy Council and it will reach a decision on the appeal early
next year. I believe it is therefore imperative that the Domestic Partnership
Bill is passed into law so that the discrimination suffered by Chantelle Day
and Vicky Bodden-Bush, and others in same sex relationships, is brought
to an end as required by the Court of Appeal.

“Despite calls in many quarters for the UK to legislate for same sex
marriage, the FCO decided that passing a version of the current Bill would
be the right approach as this would fully comply with the Court of Appeal
judgment. Acting on instructions from the Foreign Secretary, I intend to
publish on 10 August the Domestic Partnership Bill and allow 21 days
consultation for the public and Members of the Legislative Assembly. My
team and that of the Attorney General will be available to consider any
additional comments on the provisions of the Bill. At the end of this period,
acting under instructions from the Foreign Secretary. I will use my
Reserved Powers under Section 81 of the Constitution to assent to the Bill.
I expect it to be gazetted and come into law at the beginning of September.

“A number of consequential pieces of legislation will be amended at the
same time to bring them into line with the new law. These will also be
published for consultation on 10 August.”,,,

The following points appear to arise from that statement:

(1)Even though the decision of the Court of Appeal is before the Privy
Council, the Governor intends to act as a matter of urgency despite
the normal rule that there should not be any public discussion about a
matter that is subjudice.

(2)The Governor not only intends to assent to the Domestic Partnership
Bill despite the cogent criticisms made during the debate thereon in
the Legislative Assembly but also – and this appears for the first time
– to amend eleven (11) pieces of legislation to bring them into line
with the new law, even though it appears that those proposed
amendments were never placed before the Legislative Assembly.
This appears to be a kind of legislation by ambush and has never
been heard of in any of the Westminster Model Constitutions.

(3) The Governor posits that the Domestic Partnership Bill in its
unaltered state (?) would satisfy the legal requirement and at the
same time maintain the current definition of marriage. This is a
strange conclusion bearing in mind that the Constitution itself states
in section 14, that marriage is to be between a male and female and
that that section is part of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.

(4)It is far from clear how persons of the same sex are deprived of any
normal human rights to arrange their domestic affairs so as to
achieve, for example, protection for their joint property, or making a
will for the devolution of their property on death or on the ending of
their relationship. The real intent of the Bill in its present form is to
equate same sex couples to heterosexual couples and to give them
the status of married couples only by another name which would
bring the Domestic Partnership Bill into clear conflict with section 14
of the Constitution although by an indirect means. This is not a
permissible exercise of the legislative power according to the decision
in Ladore v Bennett [1939] AC 468, 482, referred to by Lord Diplock
in Hinds v The Queen [1976] 2 WLR 266 at page 383.

Nevertheless, the Governor, in his wisdom purported to discuss the “failure”
of the Legislative Assembly to enact the Bill in its present form with the
FCO and UK Ministers. It is not clear whether the proposed consequential
amendments to eleven (11) other pieces of legislation had been drafted
when he spoke with the FCO and UK Ministers. It appears that those drafts
were not before the Legislative Assembly at the time when the Bill was
being debated. The Governor has stated that he is acting under section 55
of the Constitution in doing so and in proceeding to cure the failure of the
Legislative Assembly.

The Governor has not, however, referred to section 23 of the Cayman
Islands Constitution.

Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that if in any proceedings,
primary legislation is found to be incompatible with that part of the
Constitution – the Bill of Rights – the Court “must make a declaration
recording that the legislation is incompatible with the relevant section or
sections of the Bill of Rights and the nature of that incompatibility”. That is
in fact what the Court of Appeal appears to have done in its judgment.

Section 23 (2) states that where a declaration of incompatibility is made
under section 23(1) it “shall not constitute repugnancy to the Order and
shall not affect the continuation in force and operation of the legislation or
section or sections in question” so that the existing marriage law remains
valid even though there was said to be an incompatibility with section 9 of
the Bill of Rights. In addition, section 14 of the Constitution requires
marriage to be between a male and female, not to be between two persons
of the same gender; and section 14 is part of the Bill of Rights. Therefore,
the fact that the Domestic Partnership Bill failed in the Legislative Assembly
means that there is at present no existing conflict between what changes
that Bill would have made to the Marriage Law and what is contained in the
Constitution. To assent to it would, however, create a conflict with section
14 of the Constitution.

Section 23(3) provides that, “In the event of a declaration of incompatibility
made under subsection 23(1), the Legislature shall decide how to remedy
the incompatibility”. That subsection 23(3) of the Constitution, in effect,
gives the Legislative Assembly the power and the duty to decide how to
remedy an incompatibility of primary legislation with a constitutional
provision. There appears to be no provision in the Constitution which
places that duty on either of the other two branches – that is the Executive
and the Judicial Branches – to enable either of those branches to make the
decision which, according to section 23(1) is for the Legislative Assembly
to decide – see for example, Sammut v Stickland [1938] AC 678. This
principle is particularly important where a proposed Bill like the Domestic
Partnership Bill, has a distinct probability of creating a conflict with a
provision of the Bill of Rights, such as section 14 of the Constitution.

In this case, the fact that the Governor and the FCO may have “expected”
or wished for a different result, cannot confer on the Governor and/or the
FCO the power to reverse the decision of the Legislative Assembly, the
Branch of Government charged by the Constitution with making the
decision as to how to remedy an incompatibility between primary legislation
and the Constitution itself. Nor can it confer on the Governor the power to
legislate by Proclamation a Bill that has been rejected by the Legislative
Assembly in the due exercise of its powers and responsibilities.

If, therefore, the Governor proceeds to assent to the Domestic Partnership
Bill as well as the consequential amendments to eleven (11) other laws
(which proposed amendments were not placed before the Legislative
Assembly at any time before the Bill was rejected) may appear to be an
attempt by the Executive Branch to take over and exercise the powers
expressly reserved by the Constitution to the Legislative Assembly. And to
assent to and bring into force the Domestic Partnership Bill may be seen as
the Governor exercising a power to legislate for the Cayman Islands by
way of proclamation - a practice that was held to be unlawful from as long
ago as the 17th century - see for example, the Case of Proclamations
(1610) 12 Co. Rep. 74

While the Governor has referred to his powers under section 55 of the
Constitution, there is no mention of his primary duty under section 33 of the
Constitution. For example, section 33(2) requires the Governor, in
exercising his powers under the Constitution to act in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. There is nothing in the Governor’s published
statement to indicate that he addressed his mind to the provisions of
sections 23 and 33. As to his mention of section 55, there is no express
reference to which part or parts of that section he is following in the
exercise of those powers.

Section 55 provides that the Governor shall be responsible for the conduct,
“subject to this Constitution and any other law, of any business of the
Government with respect to the following matters:

(a) defence:
(b) external affairs, subject to subsections (3) and (4);
(c) Internal security, including the police without prejudice to section
58
(d) appointment to an office…”.

Subsections (a) and (d) do not appear to be relevant in this matter. As to
external affairs, presumably this was a reference to the decision of
European Court/Commission of Human Rights in the case of Oliari v Italy -
but see Chapin and Charpentier v. France (no. 40183/07) to the contrary. If
that is the basis for the exercise of the Governor’s power under section 55
of the Constitution, it becomes even more difficult to understand how the
Bill could possibly be discussed, let alone assented to by the Governor,
while there is a pending appeal before the Privy Council.

The heading to section 81 of the Constitution is the “Governor’s reserved
power. That section reads:

“81. If the Governor considers that the enactment of legislation is
necessary or desirable with respect to or in the interests of any matter for
which he or she is responsible under section 55 but, after consultation with
the Premier, it appears to the Governor that the Cabinet is unwilling to
support the introduction into the Legislative Assembly of a Bill for the
purpose or that the Assembly is unlikely to pass a Bill introduced into it for
the purpose the Governor may with the prior approval of a Secretary of
State, cause a Bill for the purpose to be published in a Government Notice
and may (notwithstanding that the Bill has not been passed by the
Assembly) Assent to it on behalf of Her Majesty, but the Bill shall be so
published for at least 21 days prior to assent unless the Governor certifies
by writing under his hand that the matter is too urgent to permit such delay
in the giving of assent and so informs a Secretary of State”.

According to that section, there are two alternative pre-conditions, one of
which would have to be satisfied if the Governor is to exercise such an
exorbitant power. They are:

(a) it must appear to the Governor, after consultation with the Premier,
that the Cabinet was unwilling to support the introduction of the Bill
into the Legislative Assembly. In the circumstances that have
happened, that precondition does not appear to have been satisfied
because the Bill was, in fact, introduced into the Legislative
Assembly, presumably by a member of the Cabinet. Or
(b) it must appear to the Governor that the Assembly is unlikely to pass
a Bill – in this case, the unamended Bill which was seriously criticized
in the Legislative Assembly – introduced into it for the purpose. Since
the voting on the Bill, it appears that nothing has been done to it to
remedy the deficiencies in it to which attention was drawn during the
debate in the Legislative Assembly.

In those circumstances it may not appear fair to say that the Bill, if
properly drafted – including the drafts of the proposed consequential
amendments to the eleven (11) other pieces of existing legislation, if
presented to the Legislative Assembly would not be considered by them.

Joan A. Sawyer